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I. Introduction
Eurozone sovereign bond markets have experienced considerable and per-
sistent turmoil in recent times. Most sovereigns have suffered downgrades
to their credit ratings since 2010. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal required
bailout programmes and the European Central Bank (ECB) intervened in the
market to purchase the bonds of larger countries like Spain and Italy. We
analyse the stability of Eurozone sovereign bond cross-market linkages over
the period 2003 - 2014, and empirically test for contagion among member
states. Contagion is defined as the excessive co-movement between bond
spreads following a shock in one market, while normal levels of comovement
constitute ‘interdependencies’.
There is already a burgeoning literature on the role of contagion in the
spread of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Results differ across studies
with, for example, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Metiu (2012) both
finding extensive evidence of contagion. The former finds that Greece was
the main source of contagion in the early stages of the crisis, while the later
stages of the crisis were characterised by multiple sources of contagion. The
latter finds evidence of contagion emanating from all peripheral countries.
In contrast, both Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) and Claeys and Vasˇß´cˇek (2014)
find limited evidence of contagion among Eurozone sovereign bond markets.
Both document very short periods during which contagion played a role but
it is limited in time and markets.
Caporin et al. (2013) attribute the propagation of shocks in Eurozone
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bond markets to integration (or interdependencies) rather than contagion.
Mink and de Haan (2013) focus exclusively on the transmission of the Greek
crisis and find that bond prices in other distressed peripheral Eurozone
states react to news about Greece. However, this is attributed to a learning
process rather than a contagious effect. Blatt et al. (2015) distinguish between
contemporaneous contagion and dynamic spillovers. Interestingly, Greece
is not found to generate immediate contagion but rather its shocks are
transmitted through a change in dynamics. On the other hand, Italy, Spain
and Portugal are found to be potentially contagious to other Eurozone
countries. Conefrey and Cronin (2015) note a marked increase in spillovers
between Eurozone bond markets during the crisis. Their results indicate
Greece becoming detached from the other markets after its second bailout in
March 2012.
We shed new light on the topic by analysing cross-market relationships
in a three-regime Markov-switching model. This allows us to identify two
distinct phases of the ‘crisis’ and provides a more subtle understanding
of shock transmission during the different phases. We employ a Markov-
switching VAR (MS-VAR) model to date the phases of the crisis and then
apply a multivariate test for contagion introduced by Dungey et al. (2005).
The crisis is best captured by two distinct regimes and both exhibit different
patterns of shock transmission. Contagion plays a limited role in propagating
shocks in both phases of the crisis but is relatively more important during the
highest volatility regime. In the vast majority of cases, market comovements
are due to interdependencies.
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Section 2 presents our methodological framework and data. Empirical
results are discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 contains our conclusions.
II. Data and methodological framework
II.1 Data
We analyse daily 10-year sovereign bond spreads over Germany for ten
Eurozone countries (Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI),
France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal
(PT)) and the US over the period from January 2003 to December 2014.
Figure 1 plots the data. Eurozone country spreads over Germany are all
negligible up to mid-2007. The emergence of turbulence in the U.S. financial
system at that time heralds a change in sovereign bond market conditions
which worsens as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis begins in 2009 and
then deepens. During this period, there is a distinct difference in the range
of movements between the ‘core’ countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, and the Netherlands versus the ‘peripheral’ countries of Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal. Italy and Spain lie somewhere in between due to the
aggressive bond buying programme of the ECB that were instigated when
these countries experienced funding difficulties. The core group continue to
have relatively low spreads over Germany, while the risk premium demanded
to hold the bonds of peripheral countries soars. These spreads, and fiscal
sustainability concerns more generally, forced Greece, Ireland and Portugal
out of the international bond markets and into bailout programmes.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
We include the US to control for external events and thereby disentangle
global from country-specific shocks. All data are sourced from Datastream.
Our sample covers the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2014. We
begin in 2003 to avoid contamination from earlier bond crises in Russia and
Latin America. Unit root tests indicate that the spreads are I(1) processes so
we choose to work with first differences. Table 1 presents summary statistics
for the variables employed in the analysis.
Insert Table 1 about here
There is a clear difference between the Eurozone ‘core’ and periphery
states, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal all exhibiting greater
mean changes and volatility than their Eurozone neighbours. Greece records
the largest average spread change and the highest volatility. With the ex-
ception of Portugal, the other periphery countries all experience negatively
skewed spread changes over Germany, in contrast to the positively skewed
changes for the core. All variables exhibit fat tails with Greece, in particular,
having large measures of kurtosis. The summary statistics suggest that a
single state model is not going to be sufficient to capture the characteristics
of these daily bond spread changes and that a regime-switching framework
may be more suitable to jointly model these variables.
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II.2 Methodology
An empirical investigation requires a testable definition of contagion and
a method of dating the crisis. Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we
define contagion as a significant increase in market dependence between
normal and crisis periods. We estimate a fixed transition probability (FTP)
MS-VAR and use the estimated smoothed probabilities to date the crisis
endogenously.1 Many studies of contagion focus on ’normal’ versus ’crisis’
periods but we find that a three-regime specification better characterises
the evolution of bond market conditions over the sample with the crisis
exhibiting two distinct phases.
The model is specified as follows:
yi,t = α(st) +
K
∑
k=1
βk(st)yi,t−k + esti,t, (1)
st ∈ {1, 2, 3} , (2)
esti,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2s ), (3)
in which yi,t is an n-dimensional time series vector of dependent variables,
α is a matrix of state-dependent intercepts, β1 . . . βk are matrices of the
state-dependent autoregressive coefficients and esti,t is a state dependent noise
vector, which has a zero mean and constant variance within each regime.
As st is unobserved, we assume that it follows a first-order Markov process,
which determines the regime path.
We then proceed to test for contagion between each pair of markets by
implementing the multivariate test of Dungey et al. (2005). This involves
1Mandilaras and Bird (2010) use a similar approach.
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estimating a system of equations with the following form.
yi,t
σi,N
= µi + µi ∗ δ1,t + µi ∗ δ2,t + γi,j ∗
yj,t
σj,N
+ θi,j ∗
yj,t
σj,N
∗ δ1,t
+ψi,j ∗
yj,t
σj,N
∗ δ2,t + ζi,t, ∀j 6= i, (4)
where the dependent variable is the first-differenced spread over Germany
for country i divided by its standard deviation in the ‘good’ regime. δ1,t
and δ2,t are dummies which take the value of 1 when we are in the ‘bad’
and ‘ugly’ regimes respectively and zero otherwise. During the former
(latter), contagion from country j to i is detected by the statistical significance
of the θi,j (ψi,j) parameter. The system of eleven equations is estimated
by the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique to account for
contemporaneous shocks and we further control for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity in the errors.
III. Discussion of results
Figure 2 presents the smoothed probabilities of each regime extracted from
the estimated FTP-MS-VAR model.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Regimes are identified from the estimated asset volatilities. We observe
three distinct regimes over the sample. The first is the ‘good’ period from
2003 to mid-2007, characterised by benign economic and financial environ-
ments (top panel, Figure 2). Spreads were low and stable and yields fell in
many countries as investors expected convergence towards German rates
(Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). Mid-2007 marks a transition to a crisis
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(bad) regime triggered by uncertainty in the U.S. financial system (middle
panel). Spreads widened and volatilities increased. This persists until late
2010 and re-establishes itself from 2013 to the end of the sample. This phase
of the crisis book-ends the ‘ugly’ regime, i.e. the most pronounced period
of bond market turmoil: late-2010 to early-2013 (bottom panel). Spreads
widened further accompanied by intense volatility coinciding with the emer-
gence of the Greek crisis and bailout programmes for Ireland and Portugal.
These phases of the crisis, nevertheless, had differential impacts across
countries. Table 2 reports the ratios of our estimated standard deviations
between the crisis regimes and normal market conditions.
Insert Table 2 about here
There is a striking difference between the volatility increases experienced
by the peripheral countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (the PIGS),
and core countries like Finland and the Netherlands. The proportional
increases endured by the PIGS during the ‘bad’ regime are, in some cases,
greater than those suffered by the core countries in either regime. The U.S.
is markedly different from the Eurozone countries. There is little increase
in volatility (at least relative to the European states) and there is hardly any
difference between the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ states.
Having identified the regimes, we test for contagion between each pair
of markets using the Dungey et al. (2005) test described in eq. 4. Panels A
and B of Table 3 present the results for the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ phases of
the crisis, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphical representation of
these results.
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Insert Table 3 and Figures 3 & 4 about here
A striking feature of our results is that there are relatively few examples
of contagion among the member states. Market interdependencies appear
to have been the main shock propagation mechanism during the turmoil.
However, when contagion is detected, it occurs more often in the ‘ugly’
than in the ‘bad’ regime. This highlights the importance of differentiating
between the two phases of the crisis and not treating it as one homogeneous
event. Among the 110 bilateral relationships analysed, we only reject the
null hypothesis of ‘No contagion’ at a 5% (10%) significance level in 9 (15)
cases during the ‘bad’ regime and 11 (24) cases during the ‘ugly’ regime.
The peripheral states of Greece, Ireland and Portugal transmit contagion
to other members in some limited instances but the presence of contagion
from these countries is not pervasive. There is little evidence of contagion
from Spain, suggesting the the bond-buying programmes of the ECB were
successful in curbing the international transmission of Spanish shocks. The
lack of evidence of widespread contagion from Greece is noteworthy and
contrasts with Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Metiu (2012). Our
results are more consistent with Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Blatt et al.
(2015) and Mink and de Haan (2013). Blatt et al. (2015) presents evidence
that it was the dynamics of the relationship between the Greek bond market
and its Eurozone neighbours that changed and not the contemporaneous
reaction, as measured here and in most studies of contagion.
Interestingly, contagion does not exclusively emanate from the PIGS.
There is at least as much evidence of contagion stemming from ‘core’ coun-
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tries. This is consistent with Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) who explain how
larger markets process information more efficiently and transmit the ‘news’
to more peripheral markets. For example, adverse shocks in the Austrian
bond market appear to have generated as many cases of contagion within
the Eurozone as larger disturbances in the PIGS.
There is also some limited evidence of contagion to and from the US
but this is predominantly with the ‘core’ Eurozone countries. For example,
Finland suffers contagion from the US in the first, ‘bad’ phase, while the
US imports contagion from Belgium and the Netherlands during the more
intense, ‘ugly’ crisis period.
IV. Conclusion
We investigate the role of contagion in propagating shocks across countries
during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We show that the crisis was not
a single homogeneous event but is better modelled as two distinct regimes.
The regimes exhibit different patterns of shock transmission. Overall, the
evidence of contagion is limited but is relatively stronger during the more
intense, ‘ugly’ phase of the crisis. Transmitting contagion is not exclusively
a phenomenon associated with the PIGS and it also spreads from the core
group of countries. However, the vast majority of pairwise relationships
remained stable over the sample period and, consequently, market comove-
ments are more often due to interdependencies rather than to contagion.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Bond Market Mean (x10−3) Std.dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Austria 0.034 0.026 0.754 21.411
Belgium 0.053 0.037 0.294 17.310
Finland 0.071 0.016 2.894 45.695
France 0.075 0.025 0.058 22.112
Greece 8.400 0.338 -5.422 328.554
Ireland 0.206 0.080 -0.959 39.212
Italy 0.355 0.067 -0.485 24.302
Netherlands 0.036 0.016 1.094 19.316
Portugal 0.647 0.116 1.028 53.779
Spain 0.316 0.066 -0.997 20.399
U.S. 0.639 0.049 -0.232 5.317
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily changes in
the 10-year government bond spread over Germany for each country
for the entire sample period. The sample consists of daily data from
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2014. Std.dev. denotes standard
deviation.
Table 2: Ratio of Standard Deviations between Regimes
Bond Market Bad Regime : Good Regime Ugly Regime : Good Regime
Austria 7.17 24.17
Belgium 7.79 30.99
Finland 5.08 13.30
France 6.90 23.87
Greece 27.22 183.34
Ireland 17.02 68.03
Italy 9.89 33.63
Netherlands 6.40 15.50
Portugal 19.56 76.15
Spain 16.24 50.59
U.S. 1.27 1.25
Notes: This table presents the ratio of the standard deviations, between
crisis and good regimes, generated from our estimated FTP-MS-VAR
model.
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Figure 1: 10-year Bond Spreads over Germany
Bond yields relative to Germany 
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Figure 2: Smoothed Probabilities
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Figure 3: Contagion during the Bad Regime
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Figure 4: Contagion during the Ugly Regime
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